A reminder, I’m not an attorney. None of this is legal advice. Simply passing along my framework, previous experience, and training.
Did you know there is a whole WPS series for free on Church Security?
Much of what I go over here will be generally good security practices for a building that you control that must remain somewhat soft but is of high value or attention. I’m focusing this at churches because of the recent training course I attended and interest in this post from Greyman-WPS. Places of worship are an interesting exercise because the are expectations, culture, mission, and tradition that are not present somewhere like a sports event or concert.
Let me start by stating this: I write all of this as a detached outsider. I likely share more qualities with the opponent than the defenders. This allows me to remain detached from that it is a church service. This means I may cause offense and tread taboo topics unaware. What one chooses to implement, compromise on, or ignore is up to the security team of that place of worship. My interest in this topic at the moment is in assisting my church going friends with their security & safety ministries, and messing with bad guys. To me, church services are a regular event, at a defined location, venue controlled by the participants, that is also targeted because of the event occurring and people attending. I find myself allied with a lot of Christians of various denominations and I wish to aid as I can.
None of this applies if you are a lone operator, in particular if working in secret without the knowledge and approval of leadership. Found a team, call it a ministry and behave as if it is a ministry. Don’t ninja operator this. If your church is adamant such a thing could never happen, guns are icky, no one will hurt us, God will protect us, etc, probably need to find a church more on the same page as you.
Physical Security Consider our pillars for lawful use of force: Ability - Opportunity - Jeopardy - Necessity/Preclusion Means - Jeopardy - Imminence. How can we remove these from the equation without creating an affront to the rights of all those attending the event? Understand because I’m using this as use of force generally proportionality is also automatically included. Consider proportionality as how crazy you make your security setup. Nobody wants or likes a TSA setup.
Many will wrongly try to remove Ability/Means by banning weaponry from the venue, but you cannot do this in an absolute way making it meaningless. Bad actors will still have weapons while good actors will be denied theirs. It becomes necessary to search every individual entering the venue in order to do this part even somewhat acceptably. I am using the term “search” in a legal sense, it’s an actual intrusion into the privacy of the person to absolutely determine what they have on their person. TSA has taken the authority to violate your 4th Amendment rights as they see fit before you enter the secure area of an airport, yet they still fail to prevent weapons from getting on planes. Dealing with means is probably best done by knowing who has the means, and knowing who you assume has means. As in, everyone else. Don’t get myopic on guns. People are regularly killed in this country by all kinds of objects including hands and feet, and at a frequency greater than with firearms! Be looking for weapons, people trying to conceal something, read body language for awkwardness and poor intent, look for someone awkwardly concealing a weapon (such as a long gun under a trench coat), look for out of season or out of place clothing, then give greater scrutiny towards that individual. My recommendation would be wherever possible security team should be aware of each other and capabilities as well as those in the congregation that are likely armed, but not actively participating in the security operation. In a way I’m turning means on its head in knowing who has it rather than denying it, such that if you see someone exhibiting means that is unknown they sit at a much higher level of suspicion and needs forced ramped against them rapidly.
Removing Opportunity is an area you can strongly act. Consider how this can be accomplished. Security team members engaging with the individual before they reach an area with access to their target. Use an onion style security setup. Have team members interacting with people in the parking lot, people greeting and mingling with everyone in foyers and areas outside of sanctuary or nursery. Take someone trying to avoid security or greeting as a suspicion indicator, understanding this hinges on security being friendly and unobtrusive. Sanctuary and nursery occurrences mean the more forward layers have failed. Even there security members should be interacting with people, particularly unknowns. There is only so much one can do, but, problems should be identified, intercepted, and mitigated prior to Jeopardy becoming an issue.
A data point from the training was that the most dangerous place is a Southern Baptist Church Parking Lot on Sunday before or after the service. Most acts of violence at a place of worship are domestic violence related. Usually an abusive husband or boyfriend that has “lost” his woman to a church that has provided support and comfort to get her away from him. He will then go to kill her, sometimes the kids, and the pastor, priest, preacher, minister that “brainwashed” her at the one place and time he knows she’ll be there, at church. Won’t want to go in, so waits in the parking lot. Consider this in your security plans and think about how it could be mitigated without being ridiculous.
You have control over the space so you may alter the architecture in order to make it harder to commit acts of violence, especially unnoticed. For example being able to see the preacher on the pulpit from the parking lot or through a clear window is not good. Having a direct run from outside to the sanctuary is also not good. I’d argue that coming in should require passing multiple obstacles, leaving should be immediate. Doors coming in can go both ways, but there should be more doors leading out that only lead out (evacuation purposes). Barriers can be placed such as a greeting table, podium, rack of brochures or flyers, or other such item such as someone cannot take a high speed run directly from the entrance to an area of high value without needing to make a turn, stop, or some kind of detour. The more innocuous and unobtrusive this seems to the innocent the better. If it is annoying they’ll make you move or remove it. Doors can open outward from areas of high value to areas of entrance. An attacker then must stop to open the door and then restart their advance at each door (provided the doors are closed). Understand this comes with a cost as now police/rescue won’t be able to kick in locked doors as easily to come from the outside in. I have heard of SWAT cops that have the doors on their home installed backwards for this reason, they’re more concerned with attackers kicking in than EMS or Fire needing to gain forcible entry to help them. There are considerations with barricading as well. The main goal is to make a “low pass” filter. People moving normally (slowly) are unimpeded, those trying to move quickly are highly impeded and slowed. I mean these only as an examples of a way to get creative about getting the structure of the building to work to your advantage, not things to absolutely do.
Do not forget that the fight you do not have, but still get your way, including those that you do not know were about to occur, is one that you won. Your goal is through your preparations and actions preclude physical confrontation to the point you are unaware it was a possibility. If your security team seems useless because nothing ever happens, it’s very possible you’re actually doing a very good job.
Jeopardy goes a bit hand in hand with opportunity which is why in the second formulation they’re one in the same. Here is a place that a church service and ministry security team has an advantage over typical security efforts at an event; it is expected, normal, and desired for church service attendees to speak to one another an inquire about their lives. This is not true at a concert for a major rock & roll act or a sporting event. In this case I’ll say removing jeopardy is “diffusing the bomb”, even though the opportunity exists you’re removing the will from the possible perpetrator. They have the physical means, they have the opportunity, but now they no longer want to so don’t. Even at a rock & roll concert it was wise for security staff to have a kind conversation with the intention to aid anyone that appeared disturbed or in distress. In that case it was usually someone who was having a bad time on their drugs or had too much alcohol. But it might have been a guy that just had his girl run off with another guy at the show. Still a violent altercation was possibly averted by getting the person off site, in a better state of mind, or medical attention. A major goal of law enforcement & security is to mitigate, limit, and suppress the effect of bad actors such that the innocent do not have to deal with it themselves. Even better be unaware it can occur or be a possibility. The innocent thinking everything is fine means we’re doing our job, we’ve effectively mitigated jeopardy as perceived by them by encountering it on their behalf.
Preclusion For those of you in states where this pillar is very important the above will go a long way to an articulation of preclusion. This is even more true if you have escalating levels of force if there is time to deploy it before needing to go lethal. Necessity for states like mine always breaks down into reasonableness which again, doing the above goes a long way to articulating there wasn’t any other assured viable option.
You remove imminence by giving yourself time. This is more of winning fights you’ve made impracticable or impossible for your opponent such they do not or cannot fight them. Deadly force or possibly physical force generally becomes not necessary. It’s preparation so you have the opportunity to slow the fight to the point that you can interrupt it such that you win it without a severely violent response. Beyond that you deal with imminence by being ready yourself to deploy the necessary force level decisively and abruptly to stop any threat that presents itself. You require the skills, wisdom, and intelligence to do so properly, without hesitation, and then be able to articulate why you did so and why it was the best or only course of action. Do not forget about preclusion & proportionality because if you act sooner you can still use force even though less is justified, thus removing the imminence of needing your firearm. Walking back or undo what you did is a way to think about the severity of your force, which is not the same as effectiveness. You can undo a grapple with an apology and an explanation. Broken rib or nose can’t be undone, though it will heal. Bullet to the medulla can’t be walked back at all.
IFF/ Blue on Blue IFF = Identification : Friend or Foe. We do not have a transponder that can be carried around that one can poll to determine if they are friendly or not. We do not have defined uniforms we can depend upon that are absolutely trustworthy. We are also not military equipment being used by defined sides. Thus, IFF is a major problem in the self-defense world. I’ve written on this topic previously. In this context the best way to handle IFF is know your friendlies and their capabilities. This again is an advantage a church has over a typical event venue. The purpose is getting to know your fellow congregants. Who are cops, who conceal carry, veterans, etc? Can you know the peace officers that are likely to respond in the case of an emergency such that they’d recognize your security team members? It’ll help keep the good guys from getting shot by the cavalry when they show up. So now, if you know nearly all of the friendlies and someone presents a surprise weapon and is not known, they’re probably a bad guy and can be assumed as such unless their immediate actions indicate otherwise.
Also on this point it is very important to not rationalize the odd behavior of odd congregants. Do not fall into the trap of “thats just Johnny, he’s that way”. Too many active shooter events were perpetrated by people known to law enforcement or security, and their behavior should have been alarming, but was not because they were “just that way”. Like anything else this can be taken too far. Growing up, especially in high school in the wake of Columbine, my teachers’ and administration’s irrational fear of the martial (hoplophobia) caused them to believe I was the next school shooter even though I was peaceful, had an interest in law enforcement and the military (of course this was seen as I was violent, not that I believed in defense of others), committed no crimes, never had detention or any kind of disciplinary referral, stopped events of bullying, and had a 4.0 GPA. All of the positives were overlooked because of an irrational fear of weapons, the martial arts, cops, and the military. They focused on means and opportunity, and overlooked jeopardy being absent. So, in your efforts of security do not drive away or damage an ally because you refuse to see the totality.
Security is not there to police the congregation. Policing the congregation is the leadership’s job. Clergy or leadership using security as enforcers is absolutely inappropriate. Security is not there to enforce the doctrine of the church. Security is not there to tell Janet to quiet down. Security is there to handle severe incidents and help the congregation. This line may get blurry but when in doubt it’s not security’s job. The purpose is such that the congregation understands, believes, and experiences that security is one of them and are on the same side. If ever security is believed in opposition of the congregation then security is doing something wrong and must re-evaluate their own role and policies. In this role I’d be looking to make a security team as incognito as possible whenever possible as I think overt presence, “bouncers of God”, will cause more problems than detour.
Cowardice First on the part of the aggressor. The kinds of people that commit mass shootings are cowards. They envision themselves mowing people down and committing carnage with no resistance, everyone at their mercy. Upon being resisted in any way they stop, often killing themselves. They are not expecting a 2-way range. They see the gun as a talisman of destruction that gives them ultimate power. Interrupting their plan with resistance or it not going as they expected is exactly your goal. Of all the mass shootings in the US, so far, only 3 have been committed by more than one person. Which is odd because you’d think cowards would try and bring friends to overwhelm, but in this case the data says they generally do not.
On the part of the defender there are several issues as far as cowardice goes.
Gun as a talisman is the biggest one. Just like the shooter far, far too many believe that having a gun makes them able to handle whatever comes their way even if that weapon is in their car faaaaar away in the parking lot, or worse at their house. That mere ownership of a collection of matter makes them safe and capable. This is just not true. So not true thinking so is an obscenity. It is the height of fuddery and popular media faux-martial knowledge. Security will likely be armed with handguns, aggressor possibly with a shotgun or rifle. This is a force disparity and it takes courage, tactics, and skill to accept those odds and go to battle. Note I did not say prevail. Courage is accepting the odds, accepting your preparation, and accepting your possible impending death because it is assured if you do not act appropriately and violently. Even if so it may be unavoidable, but you engage because it is the right and necessary thing to do regardless of the cost to you.
Many on the defense side are not prepared for this and will not act as they’ve been hiding behind their possession of a weapon as a security blanket. Their preparations as “it can’t happen here”. The defender imagines a perfect scenario where they will have the drop on the opponent and take them out unopposed. There is little courage necessary when you have a hard ambush on the attacker and have them dead to rights. You likely won’t. Force on force will fix the “what I’d do” undeserved confidence. Did the defender actually prepare? What happens when in that imperfect scenario they miss or are unable to put effective fire on the target? It’s important that is discovered before it’s real and can’t be reset.
Another problem is the courage to take a life. If one has not thought extensively on the moral and legal aspects of ending another person, in the critical moment they are likely to freeze or otherwise act inappropriately. Their weapon and time training it means nothing. An extremely caring and moral person is likely to have more of a challenge here, this is where many of the faithful will find themselves at more of a disadvantage. One may even act too violently out of that fear causing collateral damage and legal problems as a result.
Who is on the security team and how they grow as warriors is critically important. There is so much more to armed security than just having a gun, running some drills on the flat range, and having a plan. Hopefully I’ve helped you along the Path on this topic.